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"Undoubtedly all laws and practices are culturally constructed, the end
products of a society's interpretive negotiations. But they have their own
relentless being nonetheless."'
I. INTRODUCTION

In this simple statement, Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner
capture the importance of what is at stake in the conversation about law
and culture. Culture, like race, class, gender, sexual orientation and wealth
is one of many ways in which the law is not neutral. Indeed, as the passage
asserts, culture is a source of law. Yet, as traditional legal positivists have

* Elaine Chiu is an Associate Professor of Law at St. John's University School of Law. I
am grateful to the following individuals for their generous assistance: Shannon Black, Rashmi
Goel, Jancy Hoeffel, Nancy Kim, Kay Levine, Diana Neyman, Kenneth Nunn, Linda Friedman
Ramirez, and Michael Simons. In particular, I want to thank Cynthia Lee for inviting me to
participate in the symposium on culture and crime.
1. ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 226 (2000).
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taught us and this statement reminds us, the law or legal doctrine can prove
to be more powerful than culture, often outlasting it.2
Law and culture are complex human institutions. Thus, it should come
as no surprise that the relationship between these institutions is also
complicated. However, some resist the complexity. A reductionist
understanding of Amsterdam and Bruner's statement is the mirror image
theory.' This theory states that the laws of a particular locale reflect the
culture of that locale.' The law merely serves as enforcement of the
common decency, propriety and morality of that culture.5 Not only is this
understanding appealingly simple, it is often invoked by judges and
legislators who see the law and their roles in shaping the law as nothing
more than an expression of the common sense and morality of their
communities. However, as leading scholars in this area explain, this
simplistic mirror image of law and culture is not true.7
Robert Post identifies two major complications First, the law does not
merely enforce cultural norms; 9 indeed, the law frequently creates new
norms which may be contrary to cultural tendencies. Second, culture itself
is not stable, coherent, or singular," and thus its malleability challenges
the law. Within any culture, there are differences among subgroups,
inconsistency and conflict between tenets, variance in adherence, and everconstant change." In countries harboring a multitude of cultures, like the
United States, this second complication is even more palpable. Given
multiple cultures, the likelihood of differences in values and moral
sensibilities is multiplied. Whose norms should the law reflect? Which
values should the law pursue? For those countries that regard their
diversity as an asset, "[t]he fundamental challenge... is how to balance

2. Berta E. Hemandez-Truyol, Globalizing Law and Culture:Towards a Cross-Constitutive
Paradigm,67 ALB. L. REV. 617, 619 (2003).
3. See generallyBRIAN TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY 1-3
(2001).
4. See id.
5. See Robert Post, Law and Cultural Conflict, 78 C1.-KENT L. REV. 485, 486 (2003)
(ascribing this description of the relationship between law and culture to Patrick Devlin).
6. See, e.g., id.
at 486 n.4 (citing Pennsylvania v. Randall, 133 A.2d 276, 280 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1957) as an example of ajudicial opinion expressing this view).
7. See generallyTAMANAHA, supra note 3, at 107-32. See also Post, supranote 5, at 486-87.
8. Post, supra note 5, at 487.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See generally AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supranote 1, at 226-31.
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a distinctive
respect for cultural heterogeneity against
1 2 the need to enforce
values."
cultural
of
set
and hegemonic
This Essay focuses on the interplay between culture and the substantive
criminal law. 3 The criminal law has two basic functions: it serves as an
expression of moral condemnation, and it determines formal punishment
by the state.' 4 Given the importance of these functions, it is imperative that
the complex interplay between culture and the criminal law is brought to
light and understood, especially in multi-cultural jurisdictions where a
single criminal law is brought to bear upon members of numerous, varying
cultures.
The relationship between culture and the criminal law reflects the
mirror image theory as well as Post's two complications. For example, the
laws against homicide articulate that in the judgment of most, if not all
cultures, killing another human being, under most circumstances, is
wrongful moral conduct and is therefore, a crime. Such laws are a clear
example of the mirror image theory. On the other end of the spectrum,
other criminal offenses such as marijuana possession do not necessarily
reflect a societal judgment against low level drug use, but instead represent
the need to maintain a distinction between illicit and legal drugs and the
need to deter the abuse of even more dangerous drugs. This is the first
complication suggested by Post at work. Such drug offenses aspire to
create norms, as opposed to reflecting already existing norms, and are very
controversial. As Post describes, this "debate about whether rules of
liability should be fashioned to achieve the instrumental goal of deterrence
or instead to reflect the moral judgment of the community"' 5 in criminal
law is "fierce and ongoing. "6
The second complication of differences in norms and values due to the
existence of many cultures and intra-cultural conflict is also seen in

12. Post, supra note 5, at 493.
13. I discuss the substantive criminal law as opposed to the selective enforcement of the law.
Numerous other scholars have lambasted law enforcement agencies and the criminal justice system
for being selective in the enforcement of laws. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury
Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 690-700 (1995).
14. Interestingly, culture also performs these same functions, albeit on a less formal level in
society. Even though culture and the criminal law share these functions, they are not always
working together. At times, the criminal law may be punishing the very behavior that a culture
encourages. "Quite frequently an official or dominant culture tries to punish behavior, which, at the
same time, a subculture rewards or supports.... [for example the] Mormons practiced polygamy;
the general government ruthlessly stamped this out." LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL
SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 106 (1975).
15. Post, supra note 5, at 488.
16. Id.
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criminal law. It usually arises in the context of a defendant who is charged
with a crime but then defends his act as an expression of his culture.
Whether the criminal law should accept a claim of culture as a defense has
been the subject of numerous academic articles; 17 however, very few, if
any, jurisdictions have formally considered the issue. 8
Thus, the criminal law, like other areas of law, has a complex
relationship with culture. In fact, a complete understanding of the interplay
requires a much lengthier treatment than one article. In this initial Essay,
I begin the study with the argument that several familiar doctrines in
American criminal law are better understood as cultural constructs. These
fundamental doctrines reflect the values of the dominant culture in the
United States. They are: (1) the rejection of the rule of retreat in deadly
self-defense; (2) the defense of habitation; and (3) the defense against
forcible rape. These defense doctrines demonstrate simple mirror
reflection as well as Post's second complication of changes in culture.
By viewing these established criminal defenses specifically as
constructs of the dominant culture, this Essay puts forth a selective mirror
image theory.'9 The criminal law is yet another source of power for the
segment of the population that is in control. Thus, the values expressed in
the substantive criminal law are those held by that segment. 20 This view of
the law is an important place to begin our look at culture and the criminal
law. It achieves two important ends. First, the Essay dispels the myth that
culture does not exist or belong in the substantive criminal law. Those who
worry that a cultural defense will inject culture where there is no culture
have no reason to worry. The current criminal law is already infused with
culture. Second, this Essay establishes that it is not just any culture that
exists in the criminal law. Rather, it is only the dominant culture that exists
in American criminal law. 21 These foundational perspectives about
substantive criminal law are critical to understand and accept before going
further in the study of the relationship between criminal law and culture.
Part II of this Essay explains two concepts that are important to these
foundational perspectives. The first discusses the meaning of dominant
17. See, e.g., Taryn F. Goldstein, CulturalConflicts in Court:ShouldtheAmerican Criminal
JusticeSystem FormallyRecognize a "CulturalDefense'?, 99 DICK. L. REV. 141 (1994); Cassandro
Turhune, Culturaland Religious Defenses to ChildAbuse andNeglect, 14 J. AM. ACAD. L. 152
(1997).
18. See generally AUSON D. RENTELN, THE CULTURAL DEFENSE (2004).
19. See TAMANAHA, supra note 3, at 40-44.
20. See id.
21. In a country where the population is no longer predominantly from one culture but instead
enjoys a multitude of cultures, is this state of the criminal law defensible? Is it desirable? Again,
these last two questions are handled in a subsequent article.
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culture, and the second explores the connection between culture and
motive in the criminal law. Parts III, IV, and V then explore in detail how
the rejection of the rule of retreat, the defense of habitation and the defense
against forcible rape are expressions of the dominant culture. Finally, Part
VI features some brief conclusory remarks.
HI. CONCEPTUAL BASICS: WHAT? AND WHERE?

A. What is the Dominant Culture?
Due to the success of the Critical Legal Studies movement,22 writing
about the law in terms of dominant and subordinate populations is no
longer revolutionary or new.23 The rallying slogan for this movement is
that the law "establishes and reflects domination and oppression."24 What
separates each school from the other within the movement is the variance
in the theories on the source of that domination and oppression.25 Critical
race theorists focus on the dominant race (white), while critical feminists
look at the dominant gender (male), and critical legal scholars describe the
dominant class (the rich). There is very little discussion or disagreement
surrounding the identity of the dominant population.
For scholars who focus on the intersection of American law and
culture, the identity of the dominant group is more complicated. This
complication is, in part, aggravated by the fact that the concept of culture
itself can be quite broad and controversial.26 Anthropology provides a
classic understanding of culture. Culture is "a set of established
arrangements for joint living, made up of such facts-of-life as kinship
' 27
rules, systems of exchange, methods of conflict resolution, and the rest.

22. See Guyora Binder, Critical Legal Studies, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 280-90

23. See GEORGE

(Dennis Patterson ed.,

1995).

& PATRICK H. MARTIN, JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND READINGS
ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1046 (2d ed. 1995). "Many hundreds of law review articles and
growing numbers of books have appeared by the critical writers." Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Amsterdam and Bruner describe a fundamental debate within anthropology on the
concept of culture. See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 1, at 221. On one hand, socialinstitutionalists believe culture is a set of rules and practices that are autonomous and capable of
being observed ethnographically. Id. On the other hand, interpretive-constructivists understand
culture to be the negotiated outcome of a people's effort to interpret their experience in living
together. Id.
27. Id. at219.
C. CHRISTIE
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It is "the corpus of rules and traditional practices that exemplify each
society's collective way of being."28
Using this classic understanding of culture, it is fairly easy to name
cultures that exist in the United States. As expected, some of these cultures
are known by the various countries from where individuals or their
ancestors originally came. There is, for example, Italian culture, French
culture, Vietnamese culture, Greek culture, Brazilian culture, and others.
There are even cultures identified by other markers such as hip hop
culture, midwestern culture, and military culture: Which of these, however,
is the dominant culture in America?
In the first breath, the answer may come easily: Anglo-Saxon culture.
Anglo-Saxon is a term whose meaning has changed throughout history.
Even in contemporary usage within the United States, the phrase has both
a broad and a narrow meaning. Broadly, it is used to refer to "people of
English, Scottish and more recently, German, Scandinavian and other
people of Northern European ethnicity . . . [in contrast to] the IrishCatholic cultural group, and French Canadians, and later Eastern and
Southern European immigrants and their cultures."29 Modern slang has
even created the acronym W.A.S.P. which means White, Anglo-Saxon,
Protestant. 30 A more narrow understanding of Anglo-Saxon is limited to
the English culture.3
Regardless of interpretation, the Anglo-Saxon culture is a sensible
choice as the dominant culture in the United States. After all, it was the
culture of the country's founders who emigrated primarily from Great
Britain. Since the founding, however, waves of immigrants from other
parts of the world have landed in the United States. Despite these waves,
the Anglo-American culture remains the core culture in the United
States, 32 a phenomenon which is not surprising to critical scholars who
recognize that members of the Anglo-Saxon culture continue to control
both the vast majority of power and wealth in this country.

28. Id. at 220. Amsterdam and Bruner use the term, superorganic,and attribute it to Alfred
Kroeber. Id. at 219.
29. Wikipedia, Anglo-Saxons, at http://en.wikipedia. org/wikilAnglo-Saxon (last visited Oct.
25, 2005) (sub-heading "use of the Term 'Anglo-Saxon' Today").
30. See id.
3 1. See 1 THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 409 (15th ed. 1998).
32. Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural
Pluralism and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 276 (1992). "The dominant culture in
America" ("[Anglo-Saxon culture] ... was, and remains, the culture of white, Protestant, Englishspeaking, Anglo-Saxon Americans. This, in the terminology of sociology, is America's core
culture." Id.
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Deeper reflection reveals, that even though Anglo-Saxon culture is
largely based on British culture, it too has been Americanized. There are
numerous instances in which Anglo-Americans have chosen to depart
from their British heritage to adopt new alternative values and rules.3 3 The
rejection of the rule of retreat discussed in Part Il is such an instance.
Thus, a more accurate statement is that the dominant culture in the United
States is Anglo-American, and not actually Anglo-Saxon culture. Members
of this dominant culture are white, Protestant and English-speaking.34
Having articulated what is meant by the dominant culture, I now turn to
the exposure of this dominant culture in the substantive criminal law.
B. Where is Culture? In the Motives
In searching for culture in the substantive criminal law, it is helpful to
consider again what culture is. Another definition from anthropology
defines culture as "a set of shared understandings, whether consciously
held or not, which makes it possible for a group of people to act in concert
with one another."35 Shared understandings refer to the "meanings that
they attach to things and experiences. '36 What separates one culture from
another is the different meanings that each culture may attach to the same
thing or the same experience. 3 '
Meanings that individuals attach to stimuli vary among cultures and are
of grave importance, especially when these meanings inspire action. As
Gerald Torres explains, "culture provides the meaning of and reason for
social action. ' 38 In the criminal law, the concept that captures the reason
for social action is motive.39 Motives are "action initiators." Thus, a

33. Anglo-American is defined as "pertaining to Americans of English or British origin." I
THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 78 (Lesley Brown,

ed., 1993).

34. See Perea, supra note 32, at 276.
35. DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, WHY CULTURE MATTERS TO LAW: THE DIFFERENCE POLITICS
MAKES, INCULTURAL PLURALISM, IDENTITY POLITIcs, AND THE LAW 86 (Austin Sarat & Thomas
R. Kearns eds. 1999) (quoting Gerald Torres, Local Knowledge, Local Color: CriticalLegal
Studies and the Law of Race Relations, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1043, 1062 (1988)).
36. Id. at 86 (citing Linz Audain, Critical Cultural Law and Economics, the Culture of
Deindividualization,the Paradoxof Blackness, 70 IND. L. REv 709, 715-17 (1995)).
37. See id. at 86.
38. See id. (quoting Torres, supra note 35, at 1061).
39. See Elaine M. Chiu, The ChallengeofMotive in the CriminalLaw, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv.
653, 666 (2005) (adopting a functional definition of motive as the reason for an act).
40. Christine Sistare, Agent Motives and the CriminalLaw, 13 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 303,
306 (1987).
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logical place to find culture in the criminal law is wherever motive is
manifested in the criminal law.
In an earlier article,41 I discuss how the criminal law suffers from its
commitment to the principle that motive is irrelevant to criminal liability.42
This longstanding principle evolved as the criminal law developed into a
system that defined liability in terms of mens rea.43 The centrality of mens
rea rendered motive virtually invisible. Superficially it appears as if motive
is not considered at all in the substantive criminal law;' however,
appearances can be misleading. Motive, and hence culture, exists in the
backdrop of the substantive criminal law in several key places. One such
place is in the formal defenses.45
This Essay looks at motive and culture as they appear in several
justification defenses in the criminal law. Generally, a defense in the
criminal law is "any set of identifiable conditions or circumstances that
may prevent conviction for an offense."46 In the mid 1970s, Paul Robinson
systematically organized and categorized the numerous defenses that
appeared in the criminal law.4 7 Despite some misgivings about whether
defenses that embody "such complex human notions of fairness and
' could be systematically analyzed, he nonetheless created his
morality"48
now renowned schema of five general categories of defenses.4 9
One of Robinson's categories is justification. Justification defenses
represent those instances in which defendants are not liable despite the fact
their actions caused legally recognized harms. These legally recognized
harms are justified because, by the same actions, defendants managed to
avoid greater harms.5" Each defendant who claims a justification defense
seeks to avoid a greater harm. In other words, they committed the lesser
harm in the choice between two harms.

41. See Chiu, supra note 39, at 653-729.
42. JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 88 (2d ed. 1960) ("[H]ardly any
part of penal law is more definitely settled than that motive is irrelevant.)
43. See HALL, supra note 42, at 81-83.
44. See Chiu, supra note 39, at 663.
45. See id.at 666-69 (describing how motive appears in mens rea, in justification defenses,
and in the elements of select crimes).
I
46. PAuL H. ROBINSON, 1 CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 21, at 70 (1984).
47. Id. at IX-X.

48. Id.§ 1 (b), at 69.
49. Id. § 21, at 70.
50. Id. § 24(a), at 83.
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More than one type of justification defense exists.5' Each type is
motivated by the avoidance of greater harm, but also varies from others by
what type of harm is avoided." For example, in self-defense, the harm
avoided is bodily harm to oneself; with regard to defense of others, the
harm avoided is bodily harm to another. Similarly, in defense of property,
the harm avoided is harm to personal property.
Stuart Green writes that "[t]he decisions a legal regime makes
regarding its justified homicide rules, ultimately, will reflect deeply held
societal values."53 Such an assessment is accurate because fundamental to
the concept of justification is the process of weighing harms against one
another. Justification is a claim that one harm was committed to avoid a
second harm. Is it the case that the second harm was a greater harm than
the first one? This process of critically weighing harms implicates the
notion of culture. For example, one culture may recognize the avoidance
of dishonor as important and accept the avoidance of dishonor as a
justification defense in its criminal law. On the other hand, a second
culture may disagree and reject such an honor defense on the grounds that
the avoidance of dishonor did not outweigh the harm committed by the
defendant.
In the United States, the law on defenses, like much of the criminal
law, is based on statutes.54 A statutory basis must exist for a defendant to
make a claim ofjustification. For example, if a defendant shot an attacker
to prevent that attacker from imminently stabbing her, that defendant could
base her claim on the deadly self-defense statute (assuming the jurisdiction
had such a statute). The state legislatures, thus, have the enormous power
of determining which harms are the greater harms and which justification
defenses are in their penal statutes. Likewise, legislatures also have the
power to determine which harms are insufficient to justify an otherwise
criminal act, and which justification defenses are not included in their
penal statutes.

51. See ROBINSON, supra note 46, § 24(a), at 83-86. There is a sub-category ofjustification
defenses known as "defensive force" justifications. They are those justifications that "arise from
a threat to a protected interest in response to which defensive force is then justified." See id.§
24(a), at 84. States further delineate between those threats where deadly defensive force can be used
and those threats where only non-deadly defensive force can be used. Deadly force, of course,
refers to force which poses risk of death or serious physical injury while non-deadly force refers
to force which poses risk of mere physical injury. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(11) (McKinney
2005).
52. See ROBINSON, supra note 46, § 24(2), at 84-85.
53. Stuart P. Green, Castles and Carjackers:Proportionalityand the Use o Deadly Force
in Defense of Dwellings and Vehicles, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 40 (1999).
54. ROBINSON, supra note 46, at V-VI.
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Certainly there are some justification defenses that are recognized by
almost all cultures and jurisdictions. For example, every state recognizes
self-defense.55 Garrett Epps writes that "[s]elf-defense is seen as a natural
right . . that arises independently of the social context in which it is
exercised."56 Although there are variations across the states, basic selfdefense is the right to use physical force to defend oneself against physical
injury and the additional right to use deadly physical force to defend
oneself against serious physical injury or death.57 Limitations on the right
of self-defense are based entirely on the principle of necessity. 8 An
individual is only allowed to inflict physical harm upon another if that
other person has unjustifiably threatened harm and the infliction of
physical harm is necessary for self-protection. 9 Necessity also requires
proportionality. The amount of physical harm permitted upon the other
person must be commensurate to the amount of harm threatened by that
other person. 60
Although these basic components of self-defense seem straightforward,
state legislatures and courts often confront complications. A common issue
is whether to require the existence of additional circumstances before
validating an act as legitimate self-defense. These additional circumstances
are typically derivations of the underlying principle of necessity. One such
example is the requirement that the physical threat one is facing be an
imminent threat. Another is the mandate that one consider other nondeadly retreat options before using deadly force to respond to a threat. The
fifty states vary as to which additional circumstances they require before
allowing their citizens to use force against another in self-defense. In Part
III, I discuss the rule of retreat and how its rejection by the majority of
states is a reflection of the dominant Anglo-American culture.
In addition to the varying requirements of self-defense among the fifty
states, the penal laws of the states differ in other ways. Notably, states also
vary as to what other justification defenses they recognize beyond selfdefense. Numerous states allow one to use physical force, or even deadly
physical force, in circumstances when one's physical integrity may not
even be threatened.

55. Id.§ 132, at 96.
56. Garrett Epps, Any Which Way But Loose: InterpretiveStrategiesand Attitudes Towards
Violence in the Evolution oftheAnglo-American "RetreatRule," 55 LAw& CONTEMP. PROBS. 303,
331 (1992).
57. See ROBINSON, supranote 46, § 132, at 96-97.
58. Id.
59. Id. § 132, at 97.
60. Id.
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These justification defenses are unlike self-defense in that they are not
universally recognized in all fifty states. Whether any one state recognizes
a particular justification defense depends on many factors such as attitudes
towards violence or the prevalence of certain types of crime. Ultimately,
though, the acceptance and inclusion of some justification defenses in the
penal code, and the rejection and absence of others reflects the judgments
of state legislatures about which harms, values and norms the law will
uphold.6 ' Such judgments inevitably rely on the meanings attached by
specific cultures. Parts IV and V look at two such justification defenses:
the defense of habitation and the defense against forcible rape.
HI.

REJECTION OF THE RULE OF RETREAT

In early 2005, Florida garnered national attention when its legislature
passed a law extending the types of places where one can use deadly
physical force against an attacker without requiring any safe retreat
alternatives." Prior to the extension, one could use deadly force in Florida
without considering retreat options only if one was at home or in one's
car. 6 3 In other words, under Florida's old self-defense laws, if one was
elsewhere, such as at school or at a park, one would have had to consider
and take advantage of any non-deadly safe retreat options prior to using
deadly force. The new statute eliminated this obligation to consider retreat
for anyone "who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is
attacked in any other place where... [one] ...has a right to be." This
incredibly broad language was designed so that in Florida, the rule of
retreat no longer exists in places such as streets, places of business, in bars
or at stadiums.65

61. See Post, supra note 5, at 493 n.39. "The problem is to differentiate between those values
which are necessary for cohesion and those which may be adjusted to allow for diversity." Id.
(quoting The Law Reform CommissionofAustralia, Report No. 57: Multiculturalismand the Law
9-11 (1992)).
62. David Royse, In Florida,It's An Eye For An Eye: New Bill Makes Self-Defense Legal,
SUN HERALD, Apr. 6, 2005, at B 1.
63. Id.
64. FLA. STAT. ch. 776.013 (2005) (effective Oct. 1, 2005).
65. See Royse, supra note 62, at R1.
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Although the rule of retreat continues to be controversial,66 it has been
a component of the penal law for centuries. Historian Richard Maxwell
Brown writes that the origins of the rule date back to thirteenth century
English common law.6 7 At that time, because the Crown wanted to
maintain a tight monopoly on conflict resolution, courts crafted legal
doctrines that would minimize self-resolution by private individuals.68 In
the area of self-defense, the doctrine that sought to reign in the exercise of
self-defense was referred to as retreatto the wall.6 9 This predecessor to the
modem rule of retreat held that "it was necessary to retreat 'to the wall' at
one's back before one could legitimately kill in self-defense."7
Contemporary statements of the rule of retreat no longer incorporate
references to the wall. Instead, they use broad language to capture the
spirit of the English doctrine. For example, the New York law on deadly
self-defense states that one "may not use deadly physical force if... [one]
• . . knows that with complete personal safety, to oneself and others
71 The
... [one] ... may avoid the necessity of so doing by retreating."
broad language allows the self-defense law to adapt to whatever factual
circumstances may arise in actual cases.
The obligation to retreat whenever one has an available safe option can
have troubling consequences. Consider the scenario that casebook author

66. Opponents of the Florida law worry about the creation of a "Wild West, shoot-first
mentality in Florida." Alan Gomez, HousePassesNRA -BackedGun Proposal;Bush to Sign, PALM
BEACH POST, Apr. 6,2005, at IA. An editorial in the Miami Herald likened the new law to an urban
rap lyric: "Kill 'em in your castle. Kill 'em in your car. Kill 'em on the streets. Kill 'em in the bar."
Fred Grimm, LegislatureGoes Gangsta with 'Kill Bill,' MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 5, 2005, at RI. The
bill's proponents believe that the legislation will protect innocent life and reduce crime in Florida
"because criminals will think twice before bothering someone on the street." Marc Caputo, House
OK's GreaterSelf-Defense Rights, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 6, 2005, at B8.
67. RICHARD MAXWELL BROWN, NO DUTY TO RETREAT: VIOLENCE AND VALUES IN
AMERICAN HISTORY AND SOCIETY 3-4 (1991).

68. Id. at 4.
69. Id.
70. Id. In his book, Brown provides a full dramatic illustration of the rule:
Should your opponent threaten you, you must not defend yourself with violence
until you have attempted to get away - to flee from the scene altogether. If you
are unable to leave the scene, you may not standyour ground and kill in selfdefense. Instead you must retreatas far as possible from your enemy: to the wall
at your back. Then, and only then - with the wall at your back and all retreat cut
off- may you legally face your opponent and kill him in self-defense.
Id.
71. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15 (2)(a) (McKinney 2005).
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and noted criminal law scholar, Joshua Dressler, presents to first year law
students:
Dina ordinarily walks along a particular street in a residential area
as part of her daily exercise regimen. One day Arthur, the resident
bully, informs her that if she comes that way again he will kill her.
Dina could just as conveniently walk along another street, but
believing that "I have every right to walk where I choose," she
decides the next day to arm herself with a licensed gun and walk
along the now forbidden route with her weapon visible to
onlookers. Arthur appears
and comes toward her menacingly. Dina
72
shoots and kills him.
Under New York law, Dina would not meet the requirements of the right
to use deadly self-defense because she chose to ignore at least two
completely safe alternatives. 73 Dina could have called the police or walked
on another street. Of course, Dina does not have to call the police or walk
on another street whenever a neighborhood bully threatens her. However,
if Dina contemplates assaulting or even killing Arthur, the rule of retreat
in New York imposes the legal obligation to use completely safe options
before resorting to deadly force. Failure to follow this obligation is a
failure to satisfy a required circumstance for the use of deadly self-defense
such that Dina is now guilty of criminal homicide as opposed to merely
exercising the lawful right to defend her life.
What disturbs many first year law students is that until the killing, Dina
was both legally and morally right while Arthur was legally and morally
wrong. Dina had the lawful right to walk on that public street and was
even licensed to carry a loaded handgun. Arthur, on the other hand,
initiated their violent confrontations by threatening Dina in the first place.
However, as I point out to frustrated students, the rule of retreat is not
about moral right and wrong; rather, it is entirely about necessity. Its sole
function is to serve as a limit on a justification defense. Thus, the rule of
retreat is best understood as yet another judgment of when it is legally
justified in the balancing of harms to take the life of another human being.
The rule of retreat responds that the taking of a life is justified only when
there are no other alternatives.
This description of the history of the rule of retreat from its origins to
its current form has thus far referred only to an absolute version of the rule
of retreat. However, many American states either modify the rule or reject
72. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 491 (3d ed. 2003).
73. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2) (McKinney 2005).
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it outright. The most common modification of the rule of retreat is to apply
it only to the use of deadly physical force in self-defense. Thus, in these
states, the rule does not apply to the use of non-deadly physical force.7 4
Indeed, only a handful of states apply the rule of retreat in both deadly and
non-deadly situations." A second common limitation on the rule of retreat
is that it does not apply to the use of deadly physical force at home.76 This
limitation is popularly known as the "castle doctrine."" In addition to
these two limitations on the rule of retreat, there are numerous others.78
In contrast to these states that impose the rule of retreat only to carve
out exceptions to it, the majority of American states simply reject the rule
of retreat in its entirety. 79 In these states, a person "need not retreat, even
though he can do so safely, before using deadly force upon an assailant
whom he reasonably believes will kill him or do him serious bodily
harm."8 The rejection of the rule of retreat by American states is an
important development in American criminal law.8 At a minimum, it is
noteworthy simply because its rejection conflicts directly with the
longstanding tradition of retreatto the wall in English common law. What
is the explanation for the rejection? The explanation is cultural and lies in

74. CompareN.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(l) (noting the absence of a rule of retreat from nondeadly self-defense), with § 35.15(2) (applying the rule of retreat to deadly self-defense).
75. ROBINSON, supranote 46, § 13 l(d)(3), at 85.
76. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(a)(i) (McKinney 2005) (combining both the castle
doctrine and the prohibition against initial aggressors using self-defense).
77. The castle doctrine onto itself, as an exception to the rule of retreat, has been the subject
of much scholarly attention, especially in the context of cohabitants physically attacking one
another. See, e.g., Catherine L. Carpenter, Of the Enemy Within, The Castle Doctrine, and SelfDefense, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 653 (2003); Steven P. Aggergaard, Retreatfrom Reason: How
Minnesota'sNew No-Retreat Rule Confuses the Law and Criesfor Alteration, State v. Glowacki,
29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 657 (2002).
78. For example, in the American Law Report entitled Homicide: Duty to Retreat When Not
on One's Own Premises,the author categorizes those jurisdictions that eliminate the rule of retreat
when one faces a felonious assault that will produce imminent peril or death or great bodily harm.
See L.W.B., Annotation, Homicide: Duty to Retreat When Not On One's Own Premises, 18 A.L.R.
FED. 1279 (2004) (Section VI. Prevention of Collateral Offense).
79. Although there does not seem to be a recent definitive count, many scholars and courts
have found that the majority of states reject the rule of retreat. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, Exploring
Southern Legal History, 64 N.C. L. REV. 77, 105 (1985); 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL LAW § 10.4(f), at 155 (2d ed. 2003); JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
LAW § 18.03(C)(1), at 203-04 (2d ed. 1995).
80. See LAFAVE, supra note 79, § 10.4(f), at 155.
81. See BROWN, supra note 67, at 5 ("[O]ne of the most important transformations in
American legal and social history occurred in the nineteenth century when the nation as a whole
repudiated the English common-law tradition in favor of the American theme of no duty to
retreat.").
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the dominant culture of the United States or at least in the dominant
cultures of particular regions of the United States.
Richard Brown observes that American states first began to reject the
rule of retreat in the nineteenth century when their criminal laws were still
based on the common law and were determined by state judges.82
Reflective of their times, these judges viewed the rule of retreat as an
affront to the values of masculinity and bravery necessary for a frontier
nation.83 Numerous examples of the language used in their opinions
substantiate their perception of the rule of retreat as a rule of cowardice as
opposed to bravery, honor, and true masculinity. These latter values would
be reflected in the rejection of such a rule. For instance, one Ohio court
wrote about how a "true man" was "not obliged to fly"' from his assailant
while an Indiana court echoed this refrain by stating that "the tendency of
the American mind seems to be very strongly against the enforcement of
any rule which requires a person to flee when assailed."" Inspired by the
frontier culture, this new doctrine of "standing your ground" swiftly
replaced the rule of retreat.86
Richard Brown attributes this remarkable legal transformation to the
mighty appeal of the frontier culture that existed at this point in American
history. This culture was so powerful that courts began to invoke human
nature, individual liberties and even divine law to defend the right to use
deadly self-defense, even when safe retreat was possible. Indeed, by 192 1,
even the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed the cultural values of standing your
ground and true masculinity when Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
eloquently wrote: "Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the

82. See id. at 15-16. Brown devotes much of his book to the personal backgrounds and lives
of the individual judges who penned the groundbreaking opinions that rejected the rule of retreat.
Brown believes that their values and life experiences were crucial to this rejection. See, e.g., id.at
14-17 (providing a brief biography of Judge William E. Niblack of the Indiana Supreme Court who
authored the influential and oft-cited opinion in Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80 (1877)).
83. See id. at 17. See also CYNTHtA K. GiLLEsPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: BATrERED
WOMEN, SELF-DEFENSE, AND THE LAW 77-78 (1989).
84. See BROWN, supra note 67, at 9-10 (citing Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186 (1876)).
85. Id.at 17 (citing Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80 (1877)). Interestingly, this sentiment of
standing your ground is similar to the moral instincts of the first year law students when analyzing
the Dina and Arthur problem. See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
86. BROWN, supranote 67, at 8. Brown wrote "following the westward movement of settlers
from the Appalachians to the Pacific Coast, state after state saw its highest court repudiate the duty
to retreat in favor of the doctrine of standing one's ground." Id.
87. Id.ch. 1 passim. Brown argues in the remainder of the book that nineteenth century
cultural tolerance for standing your ground by killing has contributed to the high homicide rates in
the United States and to the aggression of American foreign policy in modem times. See generally
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presence of an uplifted knife."88 As Richard Brown states, the rejection of
the rule of retreat was not merely a matter of evolving common law, but
even more importantly it was "a deeply felt philosophy of behavior with
the authority of a moral value - one that ... grew out of American
conditions and lodged in the American mind."89
Paul Finkelman offers a different explanation for the rejection of the
rule of retreat,9" but it is still one linked to the dominant culture in
American history. Instead of focusing on the Western frontiers, Finkelman
writes authoritatively about the South's "prevalence and acceptance of
violence as a means of conflict resolution"' and its influence on state
laws. It is "[t]he South's historic subculture of violence and community
' that discourages the prosecution
tolerance of killing in personal disputes"92
of killers, and ultimately leads to a rejection of the rule of retreat.9 3
Although both Brown and Finkelman concentrate on earlier periods in
American history in their analyses of the rule of retreat, the rule has been
a recent topic of debate" and will continue to be for the near future.95 Its
enduring controversy perhaps speaks both to the importance of the rule of
retreat as a restriction on the right of self-defense in the criminal law and
to its cultural salience. The question of whether and when a state will
require retreat before the use of deadly force involves complex judgments
about the competing values of human life, of standing your ground, and of
individual versus state resolution of conflict between citizens. Choosing

88. See Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335,343 (1921).
89. BROWN, supra note 67, at 36.
90. A third explanation is the rise of guns as the weapon of choice in violent conflicts
between individuals. In 1905, a Minnesotajudge in 1905 criticized the rule of retreat as a ill-suited
remnant from medieval times that no longer made sense in the wild, frontier world of rifles and
firearms. Id.at 17-20 (describing the opinion in State v. Gardner, 104 N.W. 971 (Minn. 1905)).
91. Finkelman, supra note 79, at 101 (citing James W. Ely & Terry Calvani, Forward to
Symposium on the Legal History of the South, 32 VAND. L. REv. 1,3 (1979).
92. Id. at 104 (quoting Richard M. Brown, Southern Violence - Regional Problem or
National Nemesis?: Legal Attitudes Toward Southern Homicide in Historical Perspective, 32
VAND. L. REv. 225, 231 (1979)).
93. See id.at 105 (noting that a majority of states have adopted the "stand-one's-ground"
doctrine).
94. Since Florida's enactment, twelve more states have rejected or limited their rules of
retreat. See Tresa Baldas, 'Shoot First' Laws Hit Courtrooms, NAT'L L.J., July 3, 2006, at 1.

95. Members of the National Rifle Association (NRA) sponsored the recently enacted statute
in Florida discussed earlier. Andrew Metz, NRA Targets New York, Other States with 'Stand Your

Ground. 'Bill, NEWSDAY, Apr. 28, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 6630917. The NRA has vowed
to push for even more states to reject or further limit the rule of retreat. "We will go everywhere,
red states and blue states, including New York." Id.(quoting the NRA's executive vice president,
Wayne LaPierre).
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or balancing amongst these values necessarily implicates the meanings that
are attached by culture to things.96 What does it mean to take a life? What
does it mean to use violence? Every culture answers such questions
uniquely. Thus, in the United States, where many decision-makers are
from the dominant culture, the rejection of the rule of retreat is a mirror
reflection of the distinct Anglo-American value of standing your ground.
IV.

DEFENSE OF HABITATION

In the search for more instances of the dominant culture in criminal
law, Part IV turns from self-defense to the defense of habitation. To begin,
defense of habitation is a wholly independent justification defense distinct
from self-defense.97 Self-defense creates the right to kill another person
who is threatening your life. You can exercise self-defense wherever you
are, even if you happen to be in your own home. Defense of habitation, on
the other hand, extends the right to kill another person who is threatening
your home. In some jurisdictions, you can kill this person even if the
person is only threatening your home and not threatening your life.98 It is
critical to understand that the defense of habitation adds the right to
respond with deadly force to a threat to your home that does not include
a threat to your life. In other words, if the threat was to your home and to
your life, the threat to your life would enable you to rely on self-defense
to justify your act of killing. It is when the threat to life is missing and all
that exists is the threat to your home that you would have to rely on the
defense of habitation, and not self-defense, for a justification defense. In
this important sense, the defense of habitation goes beyond mere selfdefense.
When then should the criminal law allow the deadly defense of
habitation? What circumstances must exist before a defendant should be
able to claim the defense as justification for a killing? These questions
invoke the same process ofbalancing harms that lies behind self-defense. 99
What harms are greater than the life of an intruder so that the avoidance
of such harms is justified in taking that intruder's life? The rationales of

96. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
97. In some jurisdictions, defense of habitation is also separate and distinct from defense of
premises and defense of personal property. Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.20 (1) & (2)
(McKinney 2005) (defense of premises), with § 35.20(3) (defense of habitation), and with § 35.25
(defense of personal property).
98. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.20(3) (McKinney 2005).
99. Like self-defense and all justification defenses, defense of habitation is also based upon
the principle of necessity. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 10.6, at 553 (4th ed. 2003).
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the defense of habitation are less obvious than those of self-defense;100
nonetheless, I include this defense in this Essay because it is an important
product of culture.'"' Let us turn to the historical evolution of the defense
and describe the two main competing versions.
Not surprisingly, the origin of the defense of habitation lies in English
common law. Early versions of the defense allowed a defendant to kill
another person simply to prevent forcible entry into the defendant's
home. "o2 The defendant did not have to believe the intruder intended to
commit an offense or that the intruder threatened the defendant's life. This
original English common law version expressed the judgment that when
weighing an intruder's life against the integrity of the defendant's home,
sacrificing the life of the intruder was ajustified choice. The law preserved
the integrity of a home by successfully avoiding forcible entry and instead
causing the lesser harm of death. I refer to this original version as the
broad version of the defense of habitation because it allows the killing of
another human being to avoid a broad set of harms.
New York's defense of habitation is an example of the broad version.
In New York,
[a] person in possession or control of. . . a dwelling ... who
reasonably believes that another person is committing or attempting
to commit a burglary of such dwelling ... may use deadly physical
force upon such other person when he reasonably believes such to
be necessary to prevent or terminate
the commission or attempted
0 3
commission of such burglary. 1

100. See Judith Fabricant, Homicide in Response to a Threat of Rape: A Theoretical
Examination ofthe Rule ofJustification, 11 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 945, 945-46 (1981).

When the aggressor threatens interests other than life itself, however, the rationale
for the law's acceptance of homicidal response is less obvious. But the
development of such a rationale is crucial to any critical evaluation of legal rules
distinguishing between aggression which justifies or excuses the use of deadly
force and that which does not.
Id.

101. Id. at 979. "[There is] a universal judgment that certain interests are so important to the
human quality of life that life without them does not deserve the designation 'human.' ... The
identity of those interests is a matter of social judgment within each culture, subject to change as
cultural values change." Id.
102. In addition, the defense of property only applied if the defendant first warned the intruder
not to enter and the intruder failed to heed the warnings. See LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 10.6(b), at
555.
103. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.20(3) (McKinney 2005).

20061
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New York requires a reasonable belief that an intruder is committing or
trying to commit a burglary. The most minor form of burglary in New
York occurs when a person "knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a
building with intent to commit a crime therein. ' 4 The burglary law does
not specify what acts qualify as a crime. In its general definitional section,
New York defines a crime as "a misdemeanor or a felony."' 5 Using this
definition you can kill a person in New York who is entering your
apartment with the intent to steal a comic book, even though the theft of
this item is only a simple petit larceny. Such theft is included in New
York's broad set of harms.
Not every state has kept a broad version of the defense; indeed, the
defense of habitation has evolved. Many modem jurisdictions, including
Great Britain, 6 have narrowed the defense such that the law only permits
deadly force in defense of habitation when there is also a concomitant
threat to life."0 7 In this narrow version, a defendant who is at home can
only kill the intruder if his life or the lives of others in the home are also
in danger from the intruder.0 " If an intruder does not endanger a life, the
defendant cannot lawfully kill under defense of habitation, even if the
intruder still threatens the integrity of the home. Essentially, this narrow
version reduces the defense of habitation to a homebound version of
deadly self-defense."0 In other words, the only thing that separates deadly
104. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.20 (McKinney 2005).
105. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(6) (McKinney 2005).
106. Juliette Casey, Self-Defense: R v. Martin andScots Law, 25 SCOTS LAW TIMES 195-98

(2000).
Although law at one time favoured the property holder both as an innocent victim
and when defending himself against burglars, these concessions, premised as they
were on the stand fast approach, no longer have a place in our law. The value
upheld by our law is not the protection of the law abiding citizen's feelings of
honour and self respect but the preservation of life.
Id.
107. See 40 AM. JuR. 2D Homicide § 173 (2005) (stating that the courts of many American
states have ruled against the broad version of defense of habitation). See also ROBINSON, supranote
46, § 134, at 106-07 nn.3-4 (listing approximately fifteen American states, including New York,
that have adopted a narrow version).
108. "The theory of using deadly force to protect one's dwelling is not for the protection of
the physical dwelling itself; rather, it is for the protection of the individuals therein." 40 AM. JUR.
2D Homicide § 173 (2005).
109. Robinson even suggests that in these jurisdictions, the narrow defense of habitation is
redundant. There is no need for the delineation of a defense of habitation because the deadly selfdefense statutes in the samejurisdictions would sufficiently cover all life-threatening situations that
occur within the home and outside the home. See ROBINSON, supra note 46, § 135, at 111.
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self-defense from the narrow defense of habitation is that under the latter
defense, the killing has to occur within the confines of the defendant's
home.
There are clear differences between the broad version and this narrow
version.1 0 In the balancing of harms inherent to justification defenses, the
two versions express very different conclusions. The narrow version of the
defense rejects the judgment of the broad version that the integrity of a
home can outweigh a human life; instead, the narrow version accepts as
justified only those killings that save the lives of those within the home."'
What then is the explanation for the balancing of harms in the broad
version of the defense? An appealing explanation must exist because the
broad version is still the law in a significant number of states. 12 Some
states had never changed from the broad version, and still others have
recently reverted back to the broad version."1 3 For example, since 1963, a

110. There are not necessarily two versions of the defense of habitation. Green uses four
categories in his article: (1) Shoot the Trespassing Intruder; (2) Shoot the Felonious Intruder; (3)
Shoot the Violent or Forcible Intruder; and (4) Shoot the Dispossessor. See Green, supra note 53,
at 11-18. For purposes of our discussion, I am contrasting (1) and (3).
111. Interestingly, in the narrow model, the number of lives saved does not have to be larger
than the number of lives taken. Even if the lives of three intruders are taken to save the life of one
homeowner, the narrow version of the defense of habitation deems such an act justified. This may
seem wrong, especially in a numerical sense. How can the preservation of one life outweigh the
intentional elimination of three lives? The absence of a requirement to achieve a numerical gain
in lives is nothing new. Many scholars have offered theories to explain it, but usually in the context
of deadly self-defense. See DRESSLER, supranote 79, § 18.05, at 208-11. In deadly self-defense too,
it is also the case that taking the lives of three attackers is justified to save the life of one defendant.
The most persuasive theory is that the justification does not depend on the number of lives but
instead rests upon the relative strength of the moral claim. In both the narrow defense of habitation
and in deadly self-defense, the life of the innocent is regarded as a higher value than the life of
wrongdoer, that perpetrator is an intruder or an attacker. See id. § 18.05[B], at 208-10. Thus, it is
not a simplistic numerical balancing, but also a consideration of the moral values of lives too.
112. Green further dissects the broad version into three similar categories ("Shoot the
Trespasser," "Shoot the Felonious Intruder," and "Shoot the Dispossessor") and lists Maine,
Pennsylvania, Louisiana, New York, Alaska, and Texas among others. See Green, supra note 53,
at 12-18 nn.45, 60, & 70.
113. The title of Green's 1999 article explains the political inspiration for the recent
resurgence of the broad defense of habitation: Castlesand Carackers:Proportionalityandthe Use
o] Deadly Force in Defense o] Dwelling and Vehicles. See Green, supra note 53, at 1. In reaction
to a perceived rash of crime in the 1990s, there was a proliferation of "Shoot the Burglar," "Make
My Day," and "Shoot the Carjacker" statutes. See id.; see also Stephanie Grace, CarjackerLaw
Debated as Too Much, Too Little, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, Nov. 8, 1997, at Al; Rick
Bragg, In Louisiana,Just Assume It's a Gun in Their Pockets, NY TIMES, Aug. 31, 1997, § 4
(Magazine), at 5. Even the British are considering a return to the broad version due to a recent spate
of homeowners getting convicted for killing burglars and serving significant jail time. See Shot
Burglar Case Sparks Debate, BBC NEWS, Oct. 26, 2004 (UK ed.), available at
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homicide in New Mexico is justifiable "when committed in the necessary
defense.., of his property." ' 14 In Louisiana, a homicide is justifiable
[w]hen committed by a person lawfully inside a dwelling . . .
against a person who is attempting to make an unlawful entry into
the dwelling . . . or who has made an unlawful entry into the
dwelling.., and the person committing the homicide reasonably
believes that the use of deadly force is necessary to prevent the
entry or to compel the intruder to leave." 5
These statutes clearly state that a homeowner can kill a potential intruder
even if the intruder only poses a threat to the home and not to anyone's
life. What is the moral reasoning of such a doctrine? How can the integrity
of a home outweigh the life of a human being?
The answer is complex. Stuart Green offers several theories to defend
the broad version of the defense of habitation." 6 In the end, he concludes
that the broad version follows the usual rule of proportionality in
justification defenses.' These theories are of particular importance to our
discussion because they implicate the dominant culture. The first is that
the ownership of real property, in and of itself, is a value that should be
protected, even at the cost of death. The value is particularly high when the
real property is a dwelling." 8 An example of a statute that exemplifies this
theory is in the Model Penal Code. According to the Model Penal Code,
the use of deadly force may be justified if "the actor believes that the
person against whom the force is used is attempting to dispossess him of
his dwelling otherwise than under a claim of right to its possession."' 9

http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/england/derbyshire/3954033.stm (last viewed on Jan. 27, 2006); Carl
Schrag, The Bash-A-BurglarLaw, Dec. 14, 2004, availableat http://www.slate.com/id/2111017
(last viewed on Jan. 27, 2006).
114. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-7(a) (West 2005) (latest version of defense of habitation
statute enacted in 1963).
115. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20(4)(a) (West 2005) (deleting references to place of business and
motor vehicle).
116. See generally Green, supra note 53. Green concluded his article by stating that not any

one theory was enough to support the doctrine but conceded that an aggregation of the theories
might be sufficient. See id. at 39-40 ("Even if... none of these rationales is sufficient by itself to
justify such a privilege. .. , it might still be argued that some aggregation of these rationales would
be sufficient to support the privilege.").
117. Seeid. at25.
118. See id. at 34 (claiming as an argument for lethal force in defense at the home "such a
valuable and significant possession that one should be able to kill, if necessary, to preserve it").
119. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06(3)(d)(i) (2005).
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Critical to this theory is the requirement that the defendant possess
some kind of ownership or quasi-ownership interest in the premises. 2 °
What exactly is meant by ownership in this context? Some courts have
confronted this very question and have either strictly required actual
ownership by the defendant or broadly extended the defense even to guests
and household employees, so long as the defendant had a greater property
claim than the dead intruder.'12 In State v. Warren,2 2 where a defendant
stabbed and killed his roommate, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
affirmed the trial court's rejection of the defense request for jury
instructions on the defense of habitation, because the defense requires the
1 23
superiority of a defendant's property interest over that of the intruder.
In Warren, the Court explained:
this "defense of dwelling" exception to the general rule that the
force used in response to a threat should be proportionate is based
upon the defender's interest in the premises and the assailant's
status as an intruder. Because "implicit in the defense of dwelling
defense is the notion that the dwelling is being defended against an
intruder,"..,24 the exception does not apply where the assailant is a
cohabitant.
If the defense of habitation is exclusively about the protection of
property rights, then as Stuart Green points out, you can assert the
privilege even if you were not actually occupying the home at the time of
the intrusion. 125 To the contrary, however, most states outlaw the use of
mechanical devices such as springguns to protect property. 26 Many states
point to the lack of human discretion as the reason for their exclusion of
spring guns as legitimate defense of habitation. 27 The ban on spring guns
indicates that the preservation of property rights is not a complete rationale
for the broad defense of habitation.
Stuart Green offers a second theory, which states that the defense of
habitation is a "Defense of Dignity, Privacy and Honor.' ' 128 This theory
120. See Green, supra note 53, at 33.
121. Id. at 32-33.
122. 794 A.2d 790 (N.H. 2002).
123. See id. at 793.
124. Id.at 793 (citing State v. Hare, 575 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Minn. 1998)).
125. See Green, supra note 53, at 33.
126. See, e.g., Falco v. State, 407 So.2d 203, 208 (Fla. 1981) ("[Tlhe use of such a device is
fundamentally unnecessary and unjustifiable.").
127. See, e.g., id.; ROBINSON, supra note 46, § 134 n.8, at 108.
128. Green, supra note 53, at 35.

CULTURE IN OUR MIDST

posits that the ."violation of dignity that occurs when an intruder
wrongfully enters a person's dwelling... is so great that the use of deadly
force in response... [is] both proportional and justified."' 29 The value that
is being protected in this theory is "the protection of the law abiding
citizen's feelings of honour and self respect."' 3 ° Adding to these already
powerful emotions of dignity and respect are the expectations of privacy
that are attached to the home.
The home is also a source of privacy where the most intimate
activities in life are conducted, and from which people seek to
exclude the prying eyes and ears of strangers and of the
government. . . . When a wrongdoer seeks to enter a person's
dwelling, therefore, more than property is invaded .... [A] person's
primary source of... private habitation has been jeopardized."'
One final theory to explain the balance of harm in favor of a dwelling
in the broad version of the defense lies not in the privacy, dignity, and
honor that a home represents, but rather in the physical safety that it
provides. In other words, the home is "something peculiarly sacred
because of the function it fulfills."' 32 This concept of the home as a place
of safety and shelter reaches as far back as 1640. A legal treatise from that
time states that "a man's house is his castle for safety and repose to
himself and family."' 33 Wayne LaFave explains that the early English
version of the defense was "based upon the English notion that defense of
the home that sheltered life was just as important as defense of life
itself."' 31 4 Lord Coke, in his famous Commentaries asks rhetorically, "A
man's house is his castle - for where shall a man be safe if it be not in his
house?"' 35 Because the home has the important function of providing safe
haven to its owner, this third theory explains that an owner is entitled to
protect that safety to the utmost. As the Supreme Court of Illinois held in
1950:

129. Id. at 36.
130. Casey, supra note 106, at 195-98.
131. DRESSLER, supra note 79, § 20.03[A], at 238-39.
132. Green, supra note 53, at 32 (citing the commentary to MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06).
133. State v. Patterson, 1873 WL 4082, at *8 (Vt. 1873) (quoting Foster's Crown Law § 319).
134. LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 10.6(b), at 555.
135. People v. Eatman, 91 N.E.2d 387, 390 (111. 1950) (quoting Lord Coke's Commentaries,
3 Institute § 162).
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We think it may be safely laid down to be the law of this State that
a man's habitation is one place where he may rest secure in the
knowledge that he will not be disturbed by persons, coming within,
without proper invitation or warrant, and that he may use all of the
force apparently necessary to repel any invasion of his home.' 36
Indirectly, this third rationale of the defense of habitation could be
viewed as a more subtle restatement of the life outweighing death rationale
of self-defense. The protection of a place that provides physical safety is
only one step removed from the protection of human life itself. However,
I think that this view is too limiting. This third theory is more than that. It
recognizes that because of the safety that a home provides, the home itself
has become independently valuable. Under the broad defense of
habitation, the value is independent of physical safety because you can kill
an intruder, even if your life is not at stake at that moment, so long as the
integrity of the place that has always provided you safety is jeopardized.
These three theories are attempts to explain the morality of the choice
to uphold property over life in the broad version of the defense of
habitation. They are also evidence of the dominant culture in the criminal
law.' 3 7 Essential to the logic of their explanations are the values and
meanings attached to real property, to property rights, to privacy, to
dignity and honor, and finally, to life. What supplies the values and
meanings, of course, is the dominant culture of the legal decision-makers.
The obvious culture supplying the values underlying these three
theories is the Anglo-American culture. For example, in the first theory on
the protection of property rights, the belief in the importance of individuals
exerting rights over property, particularly real property, and the state
protecting such rights, is fundamental to Anglo-Saxon concepts inherited
by the United States. 3 ' These beliefs or values are not shared by every
136. Id.
137. In protesting the broadness of the Model Penal Code's version of defense of habitation,
Herbert Wechsler recognized the morality at stake when he failed to convince others of his protests.
In admitting the futility of his objections, he stated in frustration that:
the deliberate sacrifice of life merely for the protection of property ought not to
be sanctioned by law. And I suppose that this is the kind of proposition that cannot
be demonstrated, that involves in the end one's convictions. And one either holds
convictions or one does not.
Green, supranote 53, at40 n. 170 (quoting American Law Inst., 35th Annual Meeting, Continuation
of Discussion of the Model PenalCode (Tentative Draft No. 8, 35 A.L.I. Proc. 285-86 (1958))).
138. "Anglo-American legal relationships are, almost without exception, characterized by
individual property rights. Indeed, private property is the cornerstone of the Western social order."
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culture. For instance, Native American studies reveals that many Native
American tribes were nomadic and/or communal societies and hence, did

not believe in the individual ownership of real property.'39 Certainly, in a
legal regime built around Native American cultural values, there would not

be a broad defense of habitation that confers a lawful right to kill in order
to protect a home.
The second theory about dignity and honor also has roots in AngloAmerican culture. Joseph Beale noted the range of triggers that lead to the

same or similar emotions.
The feeling at the bottom of the argument [dishonor] is one beyond
all law; it is the feeling which is responsible for the duel, for
war... ; the feeling which leads a jury to acquit the slayer of his
wife's paramour; the feeling which would compel a true man to kill
the ravisher of his daughter."4
Because culture assigns meaning to events and often inspires social

action,'41 culture is responsible for what triggers the loss of honor and
dignity. Although the loss of dignity and honor are emotions that are
universally felt, what triggers these emotions will vary from one culture
to the next. The broad defense of habitation rests upon the invasion of the
home as a trigger and lawfully condones the act of killing upon the loss of
honor and dignity. Only a culture that revolves around individual property
rights and, in particular, reveres the family home, would allow such a
trigger to be the basis of a lawful justification defense. Anglo-American
culture is such a culture.

See Christopher S. Byrne, Chilkat Indian Tribe v. Johnson and Nagpra: Have We Finally
Recognized Communal PropertyRights in CulturalObjects?, 8 J.ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 109, 117-19
(1993) (describing the sharp contrast between cultural communal property schemes and AngloAmerican law).
139.
To the Indian, land was not susceptible of individualistic sale and transfer.
Techuseh, the Shawnee, said, "Sell a country! Why not sell the air, the clouds, the
great sea as well as the land?" Land was an integral, inseparable part of nature that
sustained the beings that lived upon it.
CONCISE DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN HISTORY 452 (Wayne Andrews ed., 1962); see also Angela

R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to Intellectual Property in Indigenous
Communities, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, 203-04 (2000).
140. Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Retreatfrom MurderousAssault, 16 HARv. L. REv. 567, 581 (1903)
(dismissing honor as a sufficient reason to reject the rule of retreat in deadly self-defense).
141. See Torres, supra note 35.
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Similar to the second theory, the third theory is also a reflection of the
dominant culture because it relies on the romanticized cultural construct
of the home. The Anglo-American culture attaches such great meaning to
the home such that the integrity of the home is protected in a justification
defense, wholly separate and independent from the life of the homeowner.
Whether the first, second, or third theory better explains a broad
defense of habitation is not particularly important; instead, the significance
lies in that all three theories reflect the values and traits of AngloAmerican culture. The continuing presence of the broad defense of
habitation in the United States strongly demonstrates the continuing
influence of Anglo-American culture in our criminal laws.
V. DEFENSE AGAINST FORCIBLE RAPE

The third example of a justification defense that reflects the values and
moral norms of the Anglo-American culture is the right to use deadly
physical force against an imminent, forcible rape. States have taken
different approaches to the formulation of this justification defense. Some
states use a general statement that deadly force can be used to prevent the
commission of a felony142 or a forcible felony,'43 and include rape within
their formal definitions of felony or forcible felony.1" Approximately ten
states specify rape as one of several violent felonies in a list of instances
where deadly force is justified.'45 For example, New York has a deadly
justification defense for forcible rape, forcible sodomy, kidnapping, or
robbery. 146

142. See, e.g., CAL. PENALCODE § 197(1) (West 2005) (providing that homicide is justifiable
when committed by a person resisting an attempt to commit a felony); California defines a felony
as any crime punishable by death or imprisonment in state prison. Id. § 17(a).
143. See, e.g., 720 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-1 (West 2005) (stating that a person is justified
in using deadly force if such force is used to prevent a forcible felony).
144. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 264(a) (West 2005) (stating that rape is punishable by
imprisonment in state prison); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-8 (West 2005) (categorizing rape
as a forcible felony).
145. See ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(a)(3) (2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-704(2)(c) (2005);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 464(c) (2005); HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-304(2) (2004); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 563.031(2) (West 2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1409(4) (2005); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §
627:4(II)(c) (2005); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505(b)(2) (West 2005); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 9.32(a)(3)(B) (Vernon 2005). The Model Penal Code uses a third approach, which is to list nonconsensual sexual intercourse as one of several harms which can be prevented by deadly force.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(1) (2004).
146. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(b) (McKinney 2005).
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Notwithstanding which approach is used, all these defenses operate
independently of self-defense. As with the defense of habitation, the
defense against forcible rape does not require any threat to the life of the
defendant.147 In fact, given recent minimization of the amount of force
necessary for aforcible rape, 4 ' a threat of physical injury may not even be
required.
Consider the following scenario: Eric is in the midst of having nonconsensual sexual intercourse with Marilyn, and the only force he is using
is the pinning of her shoulders. Assume Marilyn's lack of consent has been
clearly communicated and will be sufficiently proven in court. Under these
circumstances, the defense against forcible rape entitles Marilyn to
lawfully kill Eric. Certainly, if Eric becomes more violent, such that there
is a threat of serious physical injury or death to Marilyn, she would still be
entitled to kill Eric. The only change is that she would now be able to
claim deadly self-defense instead of or in addition to defense against
forcible rape.
This scenario demonstrates how the defense against forcible rape, like
the defense of habitation, is independent of self-defense. Defense against
forcible rape is not concerned with the prevention of death or even
physical injury, "because rape itself does not necessarily threaten life."' 49
What then is the concern of the defense against forcible rape? The defense
represents that in the balancing of harms, it is less harmful to take the life
of a would-be rapist than it is to suffer a forcible rape. The harm of a rape
is treated as more grave than the harm of death.'
To gain insight into the harm analysis behind the defense against
forcible rape, the historical origins are once again useful. The right of a
woman to kill her almost-rapist is a right that has historically been
recognized in Anglo-American law. 5 ' It grew out of the general defense
of deadly force to prevent a felony that long existed in English common
law.' What is not clear, though, when the specific offense of rape and its

147. LAFAVE, supra note 99, at 555 (illustrating that deadly force is permitted even when the
crime does not threaten death or serious bodily harm). This justification defense is entirely
independent of self-defense. See People v. Coleman, 504 N.Y.S.2d 949, 950 (N.Y. App. Div.
1986); People v. Wang, 625 N.Y.S.2d 413, 415 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
148. LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 17.3.
149. Fabricant, supra note 100, at 951.
150. See Sanford H. Kadish, Respectfor Life andRegardforRights in the CriminalLaw, 64
CAL. L. REv. 871, 887-88 (1976) ("[I]n cases of killing to prevent crimes like kidnapping and rape
•.. one may plausibly argue that the interests protected are comparable to that of the victim's

life.").
151. Fabricant, supra note 100, at 946-47.
152. See LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 10.7(c).
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prevention were identified in the language of the law. In New York's
Penal Code of 1881, the statutory sections on self-defense spoke generally
in terms of avoiding a threat "to commit a felony," "to do some great
personal injury," or "to prevent an offense against his person." '5 3 By the
time the modem statutory effort was undertaken in 1965, however, forcible
rape appeared along with other specific felonies." 4
Despite its gradual evolution, the defense against forcible rape has not
drawn much attention in appellate opinions or in scholarly commentary. 55
Indeed, there is very little exploration of its theoretical or moral
rationale. 5 6 In her 1981 article, Judith Fabricant endeavors to spur the
discussion. She focuses on the permanency and irreparability of the harms
that a forcible rape causes its victims. Because these harms are not
reparable, "no subsequent action [by the state] can fully repair the harm"
and "only prevention can adequately protect the citizen whose interests are
threatened. 1 57 Thus, because prevention of the rape can only be achieved
in certain cases by killing the would-be rapist, there arises a need for a
doctrine like defense against forcible rape.
What interests are being harmed beyond repair? Fabricant offers two
accounts. The first sheds light on the historical rise of the defense, while
the second seeks to understand its continued existence. In the first account,
she looks to the early common law on rape and describes two interests that
1 59
are being harmed.1 8 The first is the chastity of the female victim.
Chastity was essential to the social stature of women, translating into
"premarital abstinence and marital fidelity.""16 Once lost, chastity can
never be regained or repaired. Thus, for the victim, the loss of chastity was
a permanent and irreparable harm.'61 The second, equally important
interest is the honor of the female victim's father or husband. 62 Women

153. Nadine Klansky & Bernard Goetz, A "Reasonable Man": A Look at New York's
JustificationDefense, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 1149, 1168 n.7 (1988).
154. See id.; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2) (McKinney 2005).
155. See Fabricant, supra note 100, at 946-47.
156. See id. at 945-47. Gregory A. Diamond, To Have But Not to Hold: Can 'Resistance
AgainstKidnapping'JustifyLethalSelf-DefenseAgainstIncapacitatedBatterers?,
102 COLUM. L.
REv. 729, 746 (2002).
157. Fabricant, supranote 100, at 956.
158. See id.at 958-60.
159. Fabricant defines chastity not as voluntary abstinence from sexual activity, but rather as
"conformity with a sexual code imposed by law, social convention, and religious doctrine." Id.at
959.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 958.
162. Fabricant, supranote 100, at 958.
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were generally regarded as property that transferred from the ownership
of their fathers to their husbands. If a man raped a woman, then the father
and husband regarded the rape as an affront.' 63 Likewise, this loss of
control and of honor, once corrupted by a rapist, could never be erased.
The powerful confluence of both these interests gave rise to the defense
against forcible rape. "The interests of both sexes in the chastity of women
have held a place of such importance that their deprivation has been
viewed as so irreparable as to warrant prevention by homicide."'"
Due to the feminist movement and the sexual revolution, chastity is no
longer a social commodity and women are no longer the property of
men.165 Fabricant recognizes this change in society and provides a second
account to explain the continued vitality of the defense against forcible
rape. This defense is still relevant today because rape causes permanent
and irreparable harm, though the interests being harmed have changed.
Today, rape is regarded as an invasion of the body as well as "a
deprivation of the victim's right of choice over her sexual activity. 1 66 The
deprivation of autonomy can lead to "irreparable damage to [a victim's]
...
status as a full-fledged human being, in control of herself, her body and
16
her sexuality.' 167 "[T]he rape victim is deprived of her personhood.' 1
Interests such as chastity, male honor, personhood, and autonomy, rely
on culture to give them meaning and to provide a reason to value them so
much that the prevention of their harm justifies an intentional killing.
Anglo-American culture supplies these meanings and values. Defining the
loss of chastity of one's daughter or wife as a property harm to the father
or husband is well-settled in past Anglo-American culture. As Fabricant
points out, "[t]hat particular form of 'honor' which derives from the
exclusive possession of a woman has been regarded as an essential
element of the definition of a man, comparable to ideals of potency or
bravery.' 69 Similarly, the value of sexual freedom and personal autonomy
resonates in our modem Anglo-American culture centered around
individual liberty. Once again, the source of meaning in the weighing of
harms inherent in the defense against forcible rape is the dominant AngloAmerican culture.
163. Id. at 958-59.
164. See id. at 959.
165. Id. at 970.
166. Id. at 973.
167. Fabricant, supranote 100, at 978-79. The value or interest that is being protected is an
individual's autonomy, basic liberty, and self-determination. See Diamond, supranote 156, at 74647.
168. Fabricant, supra note 100, at 979.
169. Id. at 964.
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VI. BRIEF CONCLUSION
In discussing at length three justification defenses, this Essay shows
how the dominant Anglo-American culture has exerted tremendous
influence over the substantive criminal law. Indeed, that influence occurs
in perhaps what is one of the most important contexts in the criminal law
and that is, in the intricate balancing of harms to justify an intentional
killing. Being influenced by the Anglo-American culture does not mean
that the criminal law is a simple mirror reflection of that cutlure's values
and meanings. There are the complications described earlier by Post. 7 0 For
example, the fact that some of the fifty American states reject the rule of
retreat while others accept it demonstrates variance in the commitment to
the right to stand your ground.' 7 ' Likewise, the shifting interests being
protected by the defense against forcible rape shows how the criminal law
can absorb the evolving values of the dominant culture over time.
This Essay does not seek to present a simple picture of the dominant
culture and the criminal law. It also does not look to establish the dominant
culture as the sole determinant of criminal doctrine. Instead, what it seeks
to establish firmly is the fact that the dominant Anglo-American culture is
a substantial determinant of criminal law. Upon first glance, this argument
may seem obvious and insignificant. After all, the decision-makers who
determine the criminal laws are judges and legislators who are likely
members of the dominant culture; this observation is certainly not
surprising. It is simply political reality that the substantive criminal law
reflects the values and norms of its makers and their dominant culture.
Notwithstanding the logic of the political process, this observation
about the influence of the dominant culture in the criminal law still
warrants our attention. It is significant because many individuals within
the criminal justice system, and scholars outside the system, remain in
denial about the power of culture. Alison Renteln observes, in her book
The CulturalDefense, that "[o]ne major obstacle to the consideration of
cultural defenses in homicide cases is that judges frequently consider
culture to be 'irrelevant."" 72 She explains that "the real difficulty
defendants have faced in Western legal systems has been how to link
culture to the legal categories of crimes, each of which has its own
170. See supra text accompanying notes 8-12.
171. The reasons for these counter-cultural rules are varied and can be far more complex than
simple opposition to the dominant culture. For example, in explaining why the British defense of
habitation has narrowed, Casey points to the influence of article 2 of European Convention on
Human Rights and terms this "the human rights" approach. Casey, supra note 106, at 195-98.
172. RENTELN, supra note 18, at 23.
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particular elements."' 7 3 What judges, defendants, and scholars fail to
realize is that the definitions of elements, of crimes and of defenses
themselves are constructs of the dominant culture. Thus, if a defendant
seeks to offer evidence of their own minority culture in a criminal case,
that minority culture is by definition irrelevant because the doctrines of the
criminal law were created to reflect only the dominant culture.
This phenomenon has been termed the transparency phenomenon by
critical race scholar Barbara J. Flagg.' 74 Although she describes this
phenomenon with regard to race, the same is true for culture. The cultural
source of values and norms becomes lost and invisible in the disguise of
neutral substantive criminal law. Empowered by this disguise, doctrines
are then regarded as universal legal norms. They become "relentless
beings" and are no longer recognized as the norms of a particular dominant
culture. Indeed, the power of the rule of law is so great that many believe
that these doctrines are culturally and racially neutral.
As Barbara J. Flag observes:
Just as whites tend to regard whiteness as racelessness, the
transparency phenomenon also affects whites' decisionmaking
[sic]; behaviors and characteristics associated with whites take on
the same aura of race neutrality. Thus, white people frequently
interpret norms adopted by a dominantly white culture as racially
neutral, and so fail to recognize the ways in which those norms may
be in fact covertly race-specific.'75
The disturbing result of a failure to appreciate the dominant culture in
the criminal law is the imposition of a monolithic code upon all under the
fiction of objective standards. 7 6 By presenting three justification defenses
together, this Essay hopes to present a strong rebuttal against the
misleading mythology that the criminal law is a-cultural. It is only by
admitting this truth about the criminal law that any progress can be made

173. See id.
174. Barbara J. Flagg, The TransparencyPhenomenon, Race-NaturalDecisionmakingand
DiscriminatoryIntent, in CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR 220 (Richard
Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1997) "I label the tendency for whiteness to vanish from whites'
self-perception the transparency phenomenon." Id.
175. Barbara J. Flagg, Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking:FashioningA Legal
Remedy, in CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR.
176. Renteln describes this result as cultural hegemony, where "the dominant culture is
imposed on all who reside within its borders" and legal centralism or "the tendency [ofjudges] to
view only state law as valid law." RENTELN, supra note 18, at 18.
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towards the challenge of crafting a fair and just criminal law for a multicultural society.

